

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 USUN N 01433 01 OF 02 140627Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----005876 140628Z /10  
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0702

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01433

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PORG, PDEV, UNSC, SF, WA  
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: MEETINGS WITH THE FRONTLINE AND  
NIGERIA

1. AS WE MOVE TOWARD OUR TARGET OF APRIL 17 FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING ON NAMIBIA, PROSPECTS FOR ACTUALLY HOLDING THAT MEETING, MUCH LESS OBTAINING FAVORABLE APPROVAL OF OUR PROPOSALS, ARE UNCERTAIN. WITHOUT AFRICAN SUPPORT, A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING OUR EFFORT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SINCE WE WOULD FAIL TO OBTAIN NEEDED NINE AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE HAPPY TO PUT THEIR VETO AT THE SERVICE OF THE AFRICANS.

2. WE MET INFORMALLY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON ON NAMIBIA, LOOKING TO A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL NEXT WEEK. ON THE BASIS OF A CAUCUS BY THE AFRICAN GROUPS AND AT THE URGING OF SWAPO'S UN REPRESENTATIVE,

SECRET

PAGE 02 USUN N 01433 01 OF 02 140627Z

TATIVE, THE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL STRONGLY OPPOSED A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. THE AFRICANS SAW NO NEED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION UNTIL AFTER THE SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA. THE OPPOSITION RESULTS IN PART FROM SUSPICION, SPREAD BY ALGERIA, THE USSR, ETC., THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO PRE-EMPT THE SPECIAL SESSION ON NAMIBIA, BUT MOSTLY THERE IS A DESIRE TO WAIT AND HEAR SWAPO'S

POSITION. SOME THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO AWAIT SOUTH AFRICA'S RESPONSE, THOUGH THE DESIRE TO AWAIT SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISIONS IS IRONIC SINCE THE AFRICANS HAVE NOT HERETOFORE ALLOWED SOUTH AFRICA'S VIEWS TO HINDER THEM.

3. WHILE SWAPO HAS YET TO REACT POSITIVELY TO THE PROPOSALS, AND IN FACT CONTINUES TO EXPRESS RESERVATIONS ON A NUMBER OF POINTS, THE POSITION OF OTHER NAMIBIAN GROUPS IS INCREASINGLY FAVORABLE. THE NNF AND CHURCH LEADERS HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR SUPPORT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POSITIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TURNHALLE REMAIN A MYSTERY.

4. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS PLACES PARTICULAR PREMIUM ON YOUR MEETINGS FRIDAY AND SATURDAY IN DAR. THE FRONTLINE AND NIGERIA ARE CLEARLY THE KEY TO SUCCESS OF THIS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF WE ARE ABLE TO PERSUADE THEM THAT COUNCIL ACTION AT THIS TIME IS ESSENTIAL AND HEAD OFF POSSIBLE SOUTH AFRICAN MOVES TOWARD AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, WE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN OBTAIN COUNCIL APPROVAL OF OUR PROPOSAL. BUT THE FRONT LINE AND NIGERIA MUST TAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL STANCE IF SWAPO IS TO BE BROUGHT AROUND AND SOVIET MISCHIEF IS TO BE CIRCUMSCRIBED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USUN N 01433 01 OF 02 140627Z

5. AMEMBASSY LAGOS' REPORT THAT GARBA IS BRINGING SAM NUJOMA WITH HIM TO DAR CLEARLY INDICATES THAT AT LEAST NIGERIANS, IF NOT FRONT-LINE AS WELL, REGARD DAR MEETING AS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NAMIBIA AS WELL AS RHODESIA. THIS FACT, COMBINED WITH THE COINCIDENCE IN TIMING BETWEEN THE DAR MEETINGS AND OUR MOVE IN THE COUNCIL, MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE AFRICANS ON BOARD. NUJOMA'S PRESENCE IN DAR IS ALSO USEFUL IN THAT THIS PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TANZANIANS AND OTHERS TO WORK ON SAM AND WEAN HIM FROM HIS REFUSAL TO FACE UP TO SETTLEMENT NOW.

6. NUJOMA'S COMMENTS IN LAGOS TO AMBASSADOR EASUM (LAGOS 4543) HIGHLIGHT THE DANGER WHICH SWAPO'S CURRENT POSITION POSES FOR THE CONTACT GROUP INITIATIVE. I BELIEVE THAT NIGERIANS AND FRONT-LINE REALIZE THAT CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, AS IT STANDS, REPRESENTS THE BEST CHANCE FOR A SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE, HOWEVER, THE FRONTLINE AND NIGERIA WILL PERSIST IN THE FICTION OF FOLLOWING SWAPO'S LEAD UNLESS THE ISSUE IS PUT TO THEM SQUARELY. ACCEPTANCE OF NUJOMA'S PROPOSAL FOR ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SIMPLY CONSIGN US TO

PERHAPS MONTHS OF ADDITIONAL TALKS WITH NO GUARANTEE THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES WOULD BE BROUGHT CLOSER TOGETHER. IT WOULD GET THE SOUTH AFRICANS OFF THE HOOK AND PERHAPS PERSUADE THEM THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT ROUTE. IN TALKING WITH THE NIGERIANS AND THE FRONT-LINE, I BELIEVE THAT THE PARALLEL WITH RHODESIA AND THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE NOW FACE AS A RESULT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S INITIAL TEMPORIZING ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN SHOULD BE QUITE

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01433 02 OF 02 140641Z  
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01433

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

PERSUASIVE. FINALLY, THE AFRICANS SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEIR DESIRE FOR A SERIES OF RHETORICAL FLOURISHES IN THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO DELAY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON OUR PROPOSAL. THIS IS CLEARLY A TOUCHY ISSUE FOR THE AFRICANS, BUT AT YOUR LEVEL, I BELIEVE THEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CANNOT ALLOW SAM NUJOMA'S INFLEXIBILITY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLICIES ON NAMIBIA.

7. ONE ELEMENT WHICH WILL BE VERY MUCH AT ISSUE IN YOUR TALKS WILL BE WALVIS BAY, WHICH MAY BE THE KEY TO PUBLICLY STATED FRONT LINE/NIGERIA SUPPORT FOR OUR PROPOSALS HOWEVER RELUCTANT SWAPO MAY BE. FOR EXAMPLE, NYERERE TOLD US THAT HE HAS IT IN NUJOMA'S OWN WORDS THAT THE

PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE WITH A STATEMENT BY THE U.S. ALONE  
ON WALVIS BAY. I DOUBT THAT NUJOMA WILL KEEP HIS WORD  
BUT WE MAY NEED TO OFFER SUCH A STATEMENT TO SWAPO  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 USUN N 01433 02 OF 02 140641Z

IN ORDER TO FINALLY PULL NYERERE INTO PUBLIC SUPPORT.

8. SINCE YOUR MEETINGS IN LAGOS, THE WALVIS BAY QUESTION  
HAS BEEN LEFT UP IN THE AIR. AT LAGOS WE UNDERTOOK TO  
MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON OUR OWN, IF NECESSARY, AND IN  
CONJUNCTION WITH THE FIVE, IF POSSIBLE, THAT THE OUTCOME  
OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA AND SOUTH  
AFRICA SHOULD BE THE INCLUSION OF WALVIS BAY IN NAMIBIA.  
SUBSEQUENTLY, IN NEW YORK, WE WERE UNABLE TO GET THE  
AGREEMENT OF THE FIVE. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT  
AT A RESULT OF LAGOS, THE AFRICANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS  
EXPECT US TO INFORM SWAPO OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO UNILATE-  
RALLY MAKE A STATEMENT ON WALVIS BAY IF SWAPO WILL PUB-  
LICLY ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS. SWAPO MAY HAVE LEARNED OF  
OUR POSITION ON WALVIS BAY AS A RESULT OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS  
WITH THE NIGERIANS. IN ANY EVENT, FOR REASONS UNCLEAR  
TO ME, WE HAVE NOT OURSELVES FULFILLED OUR COMMITMENT  
AT LAGOS TO SPEAK WITH SWAPO ON WALVIS BAY. I BELIEVE  
YOU SHOULD USE YOUR MEETING IN DAR TO DO SO, HOLDING IN  
MIND, OF COURSE, THAT DAVID OWEN WILL NOT WISH TO BE  
ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A DISCUSSION AT THIS TIME. (IN FACT,  
OWEN MAY PROPOSE, AS HAVE THE BRITISH HERE, THAT WE  
AGREE TO SUPPORT SWAPO ON WALVIS BAY IN RETURN FOR A  
COMMITMENT ON THE FUTURE NEUTRALITY OF THE PORT. I  
BELIEVE THIS SUGGESTION TO BE NON-STARTER WITH SWAPO AND  
THE AFRICANS.)

9. IN SUM, SO FAR AS THE AFRICANS ARE CONCERNED WE NEED  
TO COME OUT OF DAR WITH H CLEAR STATEMENT OF FRONTLINE/  
NIGERIAN SUPPORT AND APPPPPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS, FOR SE-  
CURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSALS NOW. WE WOULD  
LIKE THE FRONTLINE/NIGERIAN SUPPORT TO BE BASED ON  
SWAPO'S AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSALS BUT THE FRONTLINE  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 USUN N 01433 02 OF 02 140641Z

MAY HAVE TO ACT ALONE AND RECOGNIZE THAT A FAVORABLE  
SWAPO RESPONSE WILL ONLY COME IN THE FACE OF THE FRONT-  
LINE'S WILLINGNESS TO ACT ALONE. FINALLY, THEY SHOULD  
INSTRUCT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK, ACCORDINGLY.

10. WITH REGARD TO DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTHA, I BELIEVE WE

ARE LIKELY TO GET A SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE OF "YES, BUT," OR AN EFFORT TO FORMALLY INCLUDE EXPLANATORY CONVERSATIONS IN THE PROPOSALS. IN MY VIEW THIS KIND OF RESPONSE IS EQUIVALENT TO SWAPO'S DESIRE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUGHT TO BE RESISTED. SIMILARLY, THOUGH DAVID OWEN MAY BE INCLINED TO DO OTHERWISE, I STRONGLY URGE THAT WE SEVERELY LIMIT ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. IN THE FIRST PLACE, SOME OF THE INTERPRETATIONS WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEK, AND WHICH OWEN HAS BEEN TOO WILLING TO ACCOMMODATE, ARE NOT SO INNOCENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICA CONTEXT AND WILL SURELY GET US IN TROUBLE WITH THE OTHER PARTIES. IN ADDITION, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT NONE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND IN FACT ARE OFFICIALLY LEAKED IN A MANNER TO APPEAR FAVORABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA. I REALIZE THAT THESE LEAKS MAY BE INTENDED BY BOTHA TO HELP HIM SELL THE PROPOSALS TO HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE THE ALREADY SUSPICIOUS AFRICANS WILL ACCUSE US OF DOUBLE-DEALING--AN OBJECTIVE WHICH BOTHA MAY ALSO SEEK. THE SOUTH AFRICANS NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE PROPOSALS STAND ON THEIR OWN AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION KNOWING THAT SOME PARTS ARE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM THAN OTHER PARTS BUT THAT ON THE WHOLE THE PROPOSALS ARE THE BEST POSSIBLE UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

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